international judicial cooperation

Interpol was founded . international judicial cooperation refers to assistance and respect provided by the courts of one country to the judicial proceedings of another by staying or declining local proceedings in favour of a more appropriate foreign court, by assisting foreign courts to serve foreign proceedings on local residents or collect local evidence and by A state thus would have power to hear disputes in relation to residents and assets in its territory and would not allow other states to affect its jurisdictional power. Although free trade would provide benefits to all states, some states may concern trade deficit with a particular partner state and wish to exit cooperation although it may receive reduced payoffs upon exit. October The first-mover disadvantage at the ratification stage is not a fundamental barrier and may disappear over time. Game theory differs from other strands of rational choice theory in that it examines the interactive and strategic decision-making where the decision of one state depends on the action of others.39 For game theory to apply, the actor should presume that other actors are also rational,40 and it should be able to predict the preferences and interests of other actors. 3.5 International judicial cooperation. See KF Tsang, Enforcement of Foreign Commercial Judgments in China (2018) 14(2) J Private Int L 262294; below (n 76). See the exclusion in Art 2 of the Hague Choice of Court Convention; Art 2 of the Hague Judgment Convention 2019. The late-moving countries can avoid the waste of resources and the negative consequences of trying an unproved international legal scheme, and they leave the first-movers to test the scheme for them. For more on the history of the Christchurch Agreement, see R Mortensen, A Trans-Tasman Judicial Area: Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments in the Single Economic Market (2010) 16 Canterbury L Rev 61; R Mortensen, Together Alone: Integrating the Tasman World, in A Dickinson, M Keyes and T John (eds), Australian Private International Law for the 21st Century: Facing Outwards (Hart 2013) 113; D Goddard, Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement, in Dickinson, Keyes and John, 145. A statute which has extra-territorial operation is enforced either through physical control of the offender within the territory of the country whose law has been violated, or judicial assistance between sovereign states (For example, an extradition treaty between two countries). For example, certain actions may already be taken when criminal case is initiated in pre-trial investigation stage. Judgments falling out of these grounds may also be recognized pursuant to the domestic laws of each contracting state. Besides purely economic interests, the interests of states also include reputation.36 The reputation of a state may be one factor that influences the decision of other states when they interact and determines whether other states choose to be cooperative, collaborative, coercive or non-cooperative in response to the decision of this state,37 which could indirectly affect the security and prosperity of the state. Some commentators have argued that the infinitely repeated game is the more realistic model to analyse cross-border judicial cooperation.61 In infinitely repeated games, players tend to cooperate because the behaviour of one player in one round would signal its promise and concern for the next round, and other players would act accordingly.62 In other words, the cooperative action in one round would lead other players to cooperate, whilst one betrayal may lead to punishment by others, a typical tit-for-tat situation.63 It may lead to the cooperation of players. Focuses on the mechanisms for international judicial cooperation and assistance, provided by regional and international arrangements such as the Hague Conventions on service, evidence, apostilles, choice of court agreements, and the enforcement of judgments, as well as regional arrangements within the OAS and the EU Eg Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005, Art 8(3) and (4); Brussels I Recast, Art 38; Hague Judgment Convention 2019, Art 4(3) and (4). UNILATERAL APPROACH: PRISONERS DILEMMA AND STAG HUNT, 4. See discussion in section 3.B above. Judicial Cooperation, Preventive Measures: Inter-American Convention on Execution of Preventive Measures. See the Hague Convention of 2005 on the Choice of Court Agreements. Therefore, if non-compliance indeed occurs, it is mainly unintentional due to the insufficient knowledge and capacity to interpret and implement the law, sometimes caused by the ambiguity of the law itself.152 These problems could be effectively managed by proactive compliance management, which requires a management institute, such as the HCCH or the European Commission, to provide assistance and guidance, scrutinize and prod the compliance of a treaty.153 Effective measures include publishing interpretation guidance, publishing report and review, sharing information, providing training, generating and dissemination good practice, and raising public awareness. First, it presumes that a state is a unitary actor because states aggregate all domestic interests and act as a single unit.23 However, in practice, no pure aggregation of interests exists because the individuals of a state usually have different or conflicting interests. Types of judicial cooperation Mutual recognition of judgments Zheng Tang, International Judicial Cooperation in Game Theory, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Volume 11, Issue 4, December 2020, Pages 522548, https://doi.org/10.1093/jnlids/idaa017. Published by Oxford University Press. See SA Riesenfeld and FM Abbott, Participation in the Making and Operation of Treaties (1991) 67 Chi-Kent L Rev 293. Whilst under the relative gains theory, the strategic decision-making focuses on whether the judicial cooperation makes other states receive competitive advantages versus itself, for example, by gaining more cases to the litigation market or by receiving more investment, instead of whether itself is better off than non-cooperation. True reciprocity means that State A will only enforce the judgments of State B under the identical conditions as State B enforces the judgments of State A. Jurisprudence and Legal Theory February 4, 2022 Wuhan University Newcastle University . The alternative has helped good progress of this project and led to a treaty conclusion. The only effective means is through an international judicial cooperation treaty, which encounters relatively small compliance and enforcement problems. the hague conference on private international law. Nonetheless, the husband wants to watch football, whilst the wife prefers opera.95 The battle-of-the-sexes game may end up in three results. 1099, 1108. This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. Nygh and Pocar (n 103) 7, Art 10(1); 2001 Interim Text, Art 10(1). A higher risk of failure exists at the early stage, and not many countries would like to take the risk to try the new system before it proves to work effectively. Realists believe that states prefer relative gains, where states focus more on distribution and whether they have gained more than other states.45 Institutionalists or neo-liberalists assume that states favour absolute gains, which means that states would value the winwin situation to boost their interests, such as the cooperation to remove trade barriers and to reduce transactions costs, even if other states gain relatively more in the cooperation.46 Absolute gain theory focuses on whether cross-border judicial cooperation would increase the welfare of one state in general, for example, improving the business environment and reducing the cost for cross-border trade, regardless of whether the other state has more proceedings to be assisted or more judgments to be enforced than its own. First, this decision is based on relative gain instead of absolute gain. Changing the self-interest driving nature of state actors is presumably difficult. This smooth and swift progress has been attributed to the same common law heritage, very similar justice systems and the confidence that both countries have in the judicial and regulatory institutions of each other that save many unnecessary safeguards and reservations.93, However, treaty negotiation close to a coordination game is very rare. Pham (n 6) 669. HL Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform (1953) 62 Yale L J 515. Fourthly, some states may not positively respond to reciprocity anyway because they do not mind being in a double non-cooperation situation. The non-cooperative decision is not made to take advantage of the other but to avoid risk. No one state can strategically influence the decision of other states, and the strategic interdependence is reduced.58 Suppose that all other countries have clear and predictable domestic private international law rules available to help State A to decide its action, State A will not have the resource to study the domestic laws of all countries to make its legislative decision. KW Abbott, Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of International Law (2008) U Ill L Rev 5, 6; JL Dunhoff and JP Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law (1999) 24 Yale J Int L 1, 2; EA Posner and JL Goldsmith, A Theory of Customary International Law (1999) 66 U Chicago L Rev 1113. The only effective means is an international treaty instrument, which tackles the lack of communication and the lack of obligations in the Stag Hunt game. In Saudi Arabia, it is unclear whether reciprocity is a condition to enforce foreign judgments. The battle-of-the-sexes difficulty can be mitigated through the facilitation of a reputable institute, increasing cooperation interests and needs and reducing cooperation standards. Judicial cooperation Judicial cooperation in Europe aims to help people resolve administrative or legal issues in other EU countries as easily as at home. Even if there is a rule, some concepts may be vague to interpret. See, eg, European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), COM(2010) 748 final COD 2010/0383, 14 December 2010, 3; European Commission, Report from the Commission on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM (2009) 174 final, 3; B Hess, The Brussels I Regulation: Recent Case Law of the Court of Justice and The Commissions Proposed Recast (2012) 49 Common Market L Rev 1075, 1100; P Beaumont and others, Cross-border Litigation in Europe: Some Theoretical Issues and Some Practical Challenges, in P Beaumont and others (eds), Cross-Border Litigation in Europe (Bloomsbury 2017) 819832; R Goode and others, Transnational Commercial Law Primary Materials (OUP 2007) 793; FK Juenger, Some Comments on European Procedural Harmonization (1997) 45 Am J Comp L 931, 934. The Stag Hunt analysis also shows that mutual cooperation would bring the optimal outcome and that unilateral defect would reduce payoffs for the defector.151. Yang (n 150) 1141. For instance, whether special contracts, such as consumer and employment contracts, are involved. This player could provide convincing evidence proving that his favourite choice is more attractive than the other, or this player offers to trade off other preferences. A late-mover may only benefit from the cost of testing the new system but no other substantive benefits. Yang, 1142; J Tallberg, Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union (2002) 56 Intl Org 609. Although State B may receive more litigations than State A and enable its citizens to be sued at home in most circumstances, the waste of public resources would be high because it may not be the appropriate and convenient forum.57 It is also likely that the hostility towards foreign proceedings makes it a risk for doing businesses with residents in State B, reducing its attraction to foreign investors. Singapore signed the Convention on 25 March 2015 and ratified on 2 June 2016. However, if a state opts for globalization instead of being satisfied with having a smaller range of selected trade partners, a large number of bilateral treaties may lead to the conflict of treaties and be ineffective in terms of the cost of negotiation and ratification. The only difficulty of the multilateral treaty approach is the battle-of-the-sexes game at the negotiation stage, which makes negotiation difficult. The 2019 Hague Judgment Convention has adopted a more flexible bilateralization mechanism in Article 29, which grants both existing and acceding contracting states the right of objection to establishing reciprocal relationship with a particular state. Triffterer, O. Therefore, the optimal choice is for the countries to cooperate. This is one of few reasons why Iraq had not joined the New York Convention for a long time, and Iraq eventually agreed to endorse the ratification of the New York Convention in Feb 2018. About Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 2. Section of International and Comparative Law), Read Online (Free) relies on page scans, which are not currently available to screen readers. versttning med sammanhang av "judicial cooperation" i engelska-arabiska frn Reverso Context: international judicial cooperation, judicial cooperation between, cooperation and judicial assistance, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, to promote judicial cooperation Basically, the international judicial cooperation is aimed at cooperation between judicial authorities in various matters of law in different cross-border situations. It is arguable that the situation is changing as the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters was adopted on 2 July 2019 (Hague Judgment Convention 2019) and as the Hague Convention on the Choice of Court 2005 (Hague Choice of Court Convention) has been applied in 32 countries. UN-2. In addition, states are not opting for short-term policy randomly. Interpol is currently headed by Major General . On 28 January 2004, the parliament ratified the European . Thirdly, although repeated game theory suggests that most countries are better off in the future with a cooperation model, it requires countries to ignore short-term loss and play in the shadow of the future. Art 45 of the Brussels I Recast; Art 9 of the Hague Choice of Court Convention; Art 7 of the Hague Judgment Convention 2019. International cooperation. Existing contracting states could initiate this right within 12 months after receiving the notification of the accession of a new member,132 and acceding states may notify the depositary the objection to establishing relationship with any existing contracting states on the deposit of its instrument.133 The bilateralism clause can be utilized easily by declaration.134 This mechanism could effectively overcome the above obstacle and could maximize the acceptance of the Convention.135, Thirdly, international judicial cooperation conventions usually allow contracting states to make reservations. Finally, arguing that the preferences of a state are stably prioritized and ranked is also hard. International Judicial Cooperation Our team works on procedural rights and International Judicial cooperation by developing research on EU criminal justice Directives, Framework Decisions and mutual recognition instruments, specifically in harmonising practices among the Member States. Unlike general rational choice theory where the common interests of states are not too difficult to assume, which usually include security, prosperity, good environment and health, those common preferences may be changed when states interact. R Pol, Proposing an International Instrument to Address Issues Arising out of International Surrogacy Arrangements (2017) 48 Georgetown J Int L 1309, 1331. Such reciprocity does not exist, and the enforcement of foreign judgments would always be subject to the different prerequisites even if reciprocity is adopted. AT von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague Conference? (1994) 57 L Contemp Problems 271; C Kessedjian, Synthesis of the Work of the Special Commission of June 1997 of International Jurisdiction and Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Document No 8) (1997), n.1. t. e. The area of freedom, security and justice ( AFSJ) is a collection of justice as well as migration & home affairs policies designed to ensure security, rights and free movement within the European Union (EU). Regan (n 43) 7071. Proceedings (American Bar Association. If both confess and choose to betray their partner, then each serves two years in prison; if both refuse to confess and decide to cooperate with their partner, then each serves one year in prison and if A confesses (defects) and B does not (cooperates), then A is set free, and B serves 3 years, and vice versa. LR Helfer, Not Fully Committed? Trans-Tasman Working Group Report, ibid 7. Some states decide to opt for short-term gains, which are deemed the optimal choice at the time of decision-making. GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL COOPERATION: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, 3. Even if a country is willing to adopt a more liberal approach to enforce foreign judgments in general, this country will impose a few prerequisites. They can choose either the right hand or the left hand, but they must make the identical choice to avoid accidents, and their interests are maximized whatever that choice is.86 This situation exists between states with a similar culture, legal tradition, quality of a judicial system, economic development, financial power and cross-border trade strategy. Usually, when states take steps in the treaty negotiation, they have shown interest to enter into judicial cooperation. Some compromises have been proposed to seek consensus. F Munoz-Garcia and D Toro-Gonzalez, Strategy and Game Theory (Springer 2016) 29. For example, the EU has a regulation that establishes a mostly EU-wide system for the transmission and execution of requests for evidence that is more efficient than the Hague Evidence Convention. For instance, State A unilaterally offers judicial assistance to State B by allowing State B to serve proceedings on residents in State A, assisting State B to collect evidence in the territory of State A and enforcing judgments rendered by the courts of State B, whilst State B does not provide the same reciprocal assistance to State A. To avoid this risk, both countries would decide to be the hare hunter, the success of which does not depend on the cooperation of the other. Theodore L Turocy and Bernhard von Stengel, Game Theory (CDAM Research Report 2001) 4; DG Baird, RH Gertner and RC Ricker, Game Theory and the Law (Harvard University Press 1998) 14; RB Myerson, Game Theory (Harvard University Press 1997) 19. To access this article, please, Access everything in the JPASS collection, Download up to 10 article PDFs to save and keep, Download up to 120 article PDFs to save and keep. Trust and obligations break the Stag Hunt game. Three approaches are available in general: de jure reciprocity allows State A to provide judicial assistance to State B if the law of State B in practice makes providing the same treatment to State A possible;65de facto reciprocity requires evidence to prove that State B has indeed provided judicial assistance to State A in the past66 and presumed reciprocity in principle allows State A to offer judicial assistance to State B unless evidence suggests that State B refused to cooperate in the past.67 No matter which approach is adopted, examining the law of the foreign country (de jure reciprocity) or researching its practice record (de facto and presumed reciprocity) is inevitable. " The committee's report Even if some conditions are similar, interpretations vary between countries. However, reciprocity does not work effectively to improve judicial cooperation in practice because it is not an effective award or sanction. MJ Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification (1983) 77 American J Int L 257. Since crime does not stop at borders, national authorities need to work together swiftly and effectively to protect their citizens and deliver justice. Other contracting states, at the same time, may not mind too much of the decision of one state to leave because it may only create limited problems and uncertainty for them, unless they have significant trade relationships with the withdrawal state and have a strong interest to receive judicial assistance from the latter.

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